主 题：Do multinationals discriminate? Information disclosure and product recalls  in China’s automobile market

主 讲 人：史册  浙江大学—香港中文大学数字经济联合研究中心副主任，助理教授

时  间：2024年12月6日周五下午14:00-16:00

地  点：第9教学楼326会议室

内  容：This study investigates how multinational firms address defective products in developing countries, focusing on China, the world’s largest automobile market. We first analyze a model highlighting the critical roles of government regulation and consumer-side factors in shaping product recall decisions. Stronger regulatory measures increase the likelihood of recalls, while the impacts of consumer factors are ambiguous, depending on the likelihood that product defects are detected. Guided by the theoretical framework, we then empirically examine product recalls of multinational car manufacturers in China. Leveraging multiple data sources including the universe of car models and recall announcement texts in both China and the US, we link defect cases reported in the US to vehicle recall records in China where law enforcement is weaker. Using text-analytic tools, we newly classify the severity of reported defects, a challenging task given the complexity of existing regulatory standards. Controlling for time-persistent product differences and yearly shocks, we find that only 12%-13% of the reported car defects are recalled in China. Safety-related or news-covered defects are more likely to be recalled. Moreover, the China-U.S. recall differences vary across brands of different countries of origin and are larger for domestically manufactured models than for imported models. Recall differences decreased after a major reform in 2012 that mandates multinationals to report foreign recalls, suggesting that increased regulatory pressure can mitigate discriminatory practices. Exploring consumer responses to recall news and its welfare implications, we find that Chinese consumers are generally unresponsive to vehicle recall events unless vehicle recalls involving severe defects are covered in official news. Preliminary welfare analysis based on structural demand estimates indicates that an information disclosure policy designed to improve consumer awareness would increase consumer welfare by 2.1%.  

主讲人介绍：

   史册，浙江大学—香港中文大学数字经济联合研究中心副主任，香港中文大学经济系助理教授。主要研究领域为产业组织与应用微观经济学，研究主题包括数字经济、平台企业与广告、医药产业的实证分析，学术论文发表在Journal of Development Economics等国际期刊。主持多项香港研究资助局基金一般项目及青年项目。曾获数字经济研究先锋奖、The Net Institute Summer Grant，两次获得港中文社科学院模范教学奖。